A week after the London conference on Afghanistan had ended, the West’s commitment was on the agenda of the 46th Munich Security Conference on Sunday, and it was no other than Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai who personally gave an introduction to the topic. Like he had done in London, President Karzai presented six major fields of activity in which his government intended to take action in the years to come so as to improve the situation in his country. With a view to the round of experts gathered in Munich, he mainly focused on the issues of national reconciliation and the reintegration of Taliban fighters, on security and on setting as a framework the necessary regional cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbors. President Karzai said he was positive that the stepped-up efforts with regard to training and equipment would serve to considerably enhance the Afghan security forces’ capabilities by 2012 so that, possibly, the Afghan government itself could provide for the security of its people from as early as 2015 onwards. In the process, Mr. Karzai continued, it might be advisable to introduce a form of universal conscription that was in keeping with the traditions of the Afghan people.
Cautious optimism
In the ensuing panel discussion, most participants were cautiously optimistic that the arrangement on additional troops and funds previously made in London might serve to bring the commitment in Afghanistan back on a successful track. U.S. Senator John McCain, for example, explained that 2010 would probably be a difficult year which might involve heavy losses for the international forces. Nevertheless, he thought it possible that some years from now, historians might consider the renewed and greater commitment as NATO’s finest hour. The United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth, too, said he expected 2010 to be a tough, albeit decisive, year for the ISAF troops. The London conference and ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal’s strategy had both served to provide the mission with adequate resources and to bring it into the right focus. The decision on success and failure would be taken in the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, depending on their protection against insurgents. Unlike the preceding speakers, the U.S. President’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke expected 2010 to be a fairly simple year for ISAF: Additional troops and planned offensives – mostly in the southern part of the country – would bring results that could be solidified by further efforts, such as a massive program to improve the country’s agriculture. All three representatives of the Western community of nations had great expectations as to the "Afghan surge".
From a regional perspective
Against this background, representatives of the region made their points, too. Pakistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Nawabzada Khan cited the considerable efforts made, and losses sustained, by Pakistani security forces in their fight against elements of extremist groups on Pakistan’s territory. His country’s important neighbor, Afghanistan, would render valuable assistance in counterdrug operations and in rebuilding the infrastructure. He therefore held that the frequently voiced international criticism of his country was inappropriate. He was followed by Dr. Dadfar Spanta, Senior Advisor on International Affairs to the Afghan President, who, speaking in German, explained that Afghanistan would continue to depend on international support for a long time to come, citing Kosovo as a warning example. Admittedly, he added, this support needed not be a military one: The integrated approach taken in London might be a success, Dr. Spanta concluded.
Differing views as to the program of reconciliation and integration
Differing views were voiced, especially so on the Afghan government’s program of reconciliation and reintegration. While some speakers and members of the audience warned against entering into negotiations with undue haste and, possibly, out of a position of weakness, others argued that negotiating with, and fighting against, insurgents would by no means be mutually excluding – both of these facets of international commitment were interdependent and could not be considered as separate issues. All agreed, though, that talks should not be entered into unconditionally. Basic human rights and security standards – such as the separation from El Kaida – were fundamental prerequisites for progress to be achieved in this field.
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